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Abstract 
Debt-financed share buybacks generate positive short-term and long-run abnormal stock 
returns. Leveraged buyback firms have more debt capacity, higher marginal tax rate, lower 
excess cash and lower growth prospects ex ante, increase leverage and reduce investments 
more sharply ex post than cash-financed buyback firms. Firms that are over-levered ex-ante 
are associated with lower returns and real investments following leveraged buybacks. The 
lower announcement returns of over-levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker 
corporate governance. The evidence is consistent with leveraged buybacks enabling firms to 
optimize their leverage, on average benefiting shareholders. The benefits decrease with a 
firm’s leverage ex ante. 
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1. Introduction 
“Corporate America is increasingly turning to debt to fund stock repurchases. Some 
investors view even debt-financed stock buybacks as a form of returning cash to 
shareholders—except, it isn’t!” -  CNBC (8th November 2011)  
Share repurchases have become a dominant payout method for firms to return excess cash 
to shareholders (Skinner (2008)). Previous research shows that share repurchases are value-
enhancing for shareholders, both in the short-term and the long-run (Vermaelen (1981), 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009)). One of the key explanations is that managers convey favorable 
information to the market by buying back undervalued stocks (Vermaelen (1981), 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)). Another explanation is that payouts in the 
form of share repurchases from firms with declining investment opportunities reduce the 
agency cost of free cash-flows (Jensen (1986), Grullon and Michaely (2004)).
1
  
Over the past decade it has been increasingly popular for firms to finance their share 
repurchase programs by issuing debt, which generates controversy. In leveraged buybacks the 
cash paid out to shareholders is raised from debtholders, which has a larger impact on a 
firm’s leverage than cash-financed buybacks. On the one hand, share buybacks from 
undervalued firms may convey favorable information to the market even if they are financed 
by debt, mitigating problems of information asymmetry or market undervaluation. Issuing 
debt to finance share buybacks also reduces the agency cost of free cash-flows as money 
borrowed is paid back over time. In addition, it may save taxes for companies as interest 
payments are tax-deductible, or because it is costly to repatriate cash trapped overseas.
2
 
                                                          
1
Other motives of share repurchases include wealth expropriation from bondholders (Bradley and 
Wakeman (1983), Maxwell and Stephens (2003)), takeover defenses (Bagwell (1991), Billett and Xue (2007)), 
inflation of earnings per share (Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002)), and capital structure adjustment 
(Bonaime, Oztekin, and Warr (2014)). 
2
 For example, Ebay was criticized by investors for repatriating cash trapped overseas to repurchase shares 
and paying $3 billion in taxes. (The Wall Street Journal, 29
th
 April, 2014). 
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Hence from a standard tradeoff view of optimal capital structure, ex-ante under-levered firms 
with substantial debt capacity, high marginal tax rate, or declining future growth options may 
conduct leveraged buybacks to increase tax benefits or reduce agency costs of free cash-
flows.
3
 Therefore, we hypothesize that firms conduct leveraged buybacks to optimize their 
leverage, which in turn benefits shareholder value. For example, Jim Turner, head of debt 
capital markets at BNP Paribas, said in an interview: “If a company has debt capacity at its 
current ratings, and it makes sense from a capital optimization point of view, share 
repurchases with bond proceeds still make good sense.” (Reuters, 6th September 2013). 
On the other hand, the informational, agency and tax benefits of leveraged buybacks may 
decrease with ex-ante leverage of a firm. It is likely that leveraged buybacks lead to excessive 
debt, which is detrimental to firm value. The adjustment in capital structure associated with 
leveraged buybacks, which is akin to a debt-for-equity swap, may increase a firm’s debt 
beyond its optimal level and raise the probability of bankruptcy sub-optimally.
4
 It may also 
lead to investment-related agency issues such as the debt overhang problem, where a positive 
net-present-value project is not invested in and firm value is destroyed (Myers (1977)). Hence 
we hypothesize that ex-ante over-levered firms are associated with lower returns and sharper 
decline in real investments following leveraged buybacks. In an article titled “Share 
buybacks: corporate cocaine”, the Economist magazine argues in its 13th September 2014 
issue “Some firms may be borrowing too much to pay for their buyback habit… Shareholder 
capitalism is about growth and creation, not just dividing the spoils.”  
This paper studies whether or not leveraged buybacks are consistent with shareholder 
value maximization and economic efficiency. We collect a comprehensive sample of debt-
                                                          
3
 For example, Lang, Ofek, and Stulz (1996) show that leverage is negatively associated with future growth 
and does not reduce growth for firms with good investment opportunities. 
4
 Moody’s Investor Service reports that rating agencies often reacted leveraged buybacks or debt-financed 
dividends less favorably than debt used for other corporate purposes (CFO Journal, Wall Street Journal, 25
th
 
March 2013). For instance, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Lowe Cos.’s debt two levels after the 
leverage increase was announced to facilitate repurchasing shares (Bloomberg, 17
th
 April 2012). 
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financed open-market share repurchases in the U.S. from 1994 to 2012. For comparison we 
also construct a sample of open-market share repurchases that explicit state that they are 
cash-financed for the same period. In addition, we match them to samples of non-
repurchasing firms with similar characteristics to calculate abnormal changes in firm 
performance, and collect a sample of open-market share repurchases that do not disclose the 
source of financing to account for potential non-random disclosure. Our cash-financed 
buyback firms have comparable firm characteristics to those reported in the buyback 
literature (Lie (2005), Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen (2007), Grullon and Michaely (2004)). 
We find positive short-term market reactions for debt-financed repurchases. The average 
three-day abnormal return for debt-financed repurchases is 2.2%, which suggests that 
leveraged buybacks send a positive signal to the stock market initially. In addition, there are 
significantly negative abnormal returns in the six months prior to the repurchase 
announcements. We also find positive long-term stock performance following leveraged 
buybacks. For the next three years following the announcements, the abnormal return for 
leveraged buybacks is 76 basis points per month (9.1% per annum). This suggests that 
leveraged buybacks, on average, benefit shareholders.  
We next examine whether the benefits from leveraged buybacks depend on ex-ante firm 
characteristics such as leverage, free cash-flows and excess cash, after controlling for 
takeover risk and other firm characteristics that may affect buyback performance. In our 
sample, 74% of leveraged buyback firms have substantial unused debt capacity and 81% are 
estimated to be under-levered ex ante. For those under-levered firms, the average pre-
repurchase debt ratio (12%) is substantially below the average target debt ratio (27%). This 
suggests that under-levered firms utilize their unused debt capacity to repurchase shares. Four 
years after the buyback announcements, the debt ratio is 6.4% higher than that before 
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repurchase announcements. The permanent increase in leverage is consistent with our 
leverage optimization hypothesis.  
We find that the average three-day abnormal returns and long-run stock performance of 
over-levered firms are lower than those of under-levered firms, supporting that the benefits of 
leveraged buybacks decrease with a firm’s leverage ex ante. However, firms are over-levered 
ex-ante in a small segment of the leveraged buyback market (19% of our sample). In addition, 
73% of leveraged buyback firms have ex-ante cash holdings below the estimated optimal 
level. But free cash-flows and excess cash do not explain the differences in market reactions 
to leveraged buybacks and to cash-financed buybacks. 
After share buybacks, firms experience a decline in real investments, similar to those 
reported by Grullon and Michaely (2004). More importantly, the decline in real investments 
is larger for leveraged buybacks than that for cash-financed ones. The reduction is also 
sharper for firms that are over-levered ex ante. More specifically, we find a 5.5% (1.1%) 
decline in abnormal investments for over-levered (under-levered) firms, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Firms with lower future growth options may conduct leveraged buybacks from a leverage 
optimization point of view. To examine whether the sharper reduction in investments is 
related to declines in future growth options, we then follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) to measure a firm’s growth prospects. We find that the growth prospects 
for leveraged buyback firms are significantly lower and decline more sharply than those for 
cash-financed repurchasing firms. However, changes in growth prospects following 
leveraged buybacks do not explain the lower announcement returns and sharper decline in ex-
post real investments that are associated with over-levered firms. Instead, we find that weaker 
corporate governance explains the lower announcement returns for over-levered firms. In 
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addition, we do not find significant differences in ex-post operating performance, financial 
distress risk, and the completion rate between debt- and cash-financed buybacks. 
Our paper contributes to the following strands of literature. First, we contribute to the 
share repurchase literature (Vermaelen (1981), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 
(1995), Grullon and Michaely (2004)) by showing that leveraged buybacks on average 
benefit shareholders. Firms with higher marginal tax rate, declining growth prospects and 
substantial debt capacity optimize leverage by conducting leveraged buybacks. The 
informational, agency and tax benefits decrease with a firm’s leverage ex ante. To our best 
knowledge our study is the first paper analyzing leveraged buybacks. Second, our paper adds 
to the literature on debt-for-equity swap. Cornett and Travlos (1989) analyze a sample of 40 
firms proposing debt-for-equity exchanges and find positive market reactions. We report 
positive abnormal returns for leveraged buybacks in which a firm simultaneously increases 
debt and reduces equity. Third, our study is also related to the literature on sources of 
financing of corporate financial transactions such as takeovers (Schlingemann (2004), 
Martynova and Renneboog (2009)).
5
 We show that the sources of financing matter for share 
buybacks. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and 
methodology. Section 3 reports our empirical results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
We collect our initial sample of open-market stock repurchases from the Securities Data 
Company (thereafter SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. Our sample contains 
open-market share buybacks announced between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 2012. 
                                                          
5
 Schlingemann (2004) analyzes the relation between the source of funds available before a takeover and 
the potential bidder gains. Martynova and Renneboog (2009) show that bidder’s pecking order preference, the 
corporate governance environment and firm’s potential growth opportunities together determine the financing 
decision in takeovers.   
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The time period is chosen from 1994 as SEC’s EDGAR Database starts providing 
comprehensive filings for buyback firms. SDC reports the “source of funds used to finance 
deal” if firms disclose relative information via corporate filings, news or other related sources. 
A share repurchase is defined as a debt-financed one if it is partially or fully financed by debt. 
To verify the reliability of the data, we collect information from SEC’s EDGAR Database 
and manually check the corporate filings i.e. 8-K, 10-Q, and 10-K for each repurchase. We 
classify a repurchase as a debt-financed one only if the filings explicitly say that the firm 
expects to use debt to fund the share repurchase.
6
 Several categories of debt financing are 
mentioned to finance buybacks in the filings, including revolving credit facility, bridge loan, 
borrowing, line of credit or debt offering etc. However, details of the exact source of 
financing for each leveraged buyback are unavailable. Similarly, we define a repurchase as a 
cash-financed one if the firm explicitly states that cash or internal fund is used to finance the 
repurchase program.
7
 The above procedures lead to 277 debt-financed open-market share 
repurchases and 433 cash-financed open-market share repurchases. As firms voluntarily 
disclose the sources of financing in share repurchases, we also collect a sample of 7,860 
open-market share repurchases that do not disclose the source of financing to account for 
potential non-random disclosure (see Section 2.6 for details). 
8
 
                                                          
6
 For example, we define the following repurchase as a debt-financed repurchase. Below is extracted from 
the Current-Event (8-K) filing of Dollar General Corp: “In connection with its previously announced $500 
million common stock repurchase program, on March 25, 2012 Dollar General Corporation entered into an 
agreement with Buck Holdings, L.P. to repurchase from it approximately $300 million in shares of common 
stock concurrent with, and conditional upon, the completion of a contemplated underwritten secondary offering 
of shares by certain selling shareholders. Dollar General expects to fund the share repurchase with borrowings 
under its asset-based revolving credit facility.”  
7
 For example, we define the following buyback as a cash-financed repurchase. Below is derived from the 
Current-Event (8-K) filing of Extreme Networks Inc.:“Extreme Networks, Inc. (Nasdaq: EXTR) today 
announced its Board of Directors has authorized the repurchase of common stock worth up to $75 million which 
may be purchased over the next three years from time to time in the open market or in privately negotiated 
transactions. Extreme Networks will fund the share repurchases from cash on hand, which was approximately 
$200 million as of September 30, 2012. As of August 6, 2012, there were approximately 95 million shares of 
common stock outstanding.”   
8
 Our samples of debt-financed and cash-financed buybacks are smaller than what SDC reports. This is 
because we rely on the disclosure from SEC filings to avoid misclassification of sources of financing and to 
remove duplicated deals from SDC. We assign 795 buybacks that SDC classifies as debt-financed or cash-
8 
 
We obtain stock returns from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) files. 
Accounting variables are collected form Compustat and we require that financial variables of 
each firm are available in Compustat in the year prior to the share repurchase. We winsorise 
all control variables of firm characteristics at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Our summary 
statistics of firm characteristics are comparable to the literature (Lie (2005), Massa, Rehman, 
and Vermaelen (2007)). The summary statistics will be discussed in Section 2.7. The sample 
for cross-sectional analysis consists of 218 debt-financed open-market share repurchases and 
357 cash-financed open-market share repurchases from 1994 to 2012.  
 
2.1  Measuring Abnormal Stock Returns 
We measure the short-term market reaction using the three-day cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) from day -1 to day 1 where day 0 is the announcement date of a share 
repurchase. We use the market model to measure expected returns and the CRSP value-
weighted market index as the benchmark. The estimation period ends 46 days before the 
repurchase announcement and we require the minimum (maximum) estimation length to be 
15 (255) days.  
We estimate the long-run abnormal returns after the buyback announcement using the 
calendar-time portfolio approach and Ibbotson’s (1975) Returns Across Time and Securities 
(RATS) method. For the calendar-time portfolio approach, we form an equally-weighted 
portfolio which includes firms in our sample that made a buyback announcement in the 
previous 12, 24 or 36 months in each calendar month. The composition of the portfolio varies 
each month and the average monthly abnormal return of the portfolio (the intercept) is 
estimated based on the Fama-French three-factor model: 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡       (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
financed deals to our non-disclosure sample, given that their relevant SEC filings do not contain the sources of 
financing used to conduct buybacks. 
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Where Rt stands for the portfolio return in month t, HML and SMB denote the returns on 
book-to-market and size factor-mimicking portfolios. Rmt is the stock market benchmark 
return, Rft is the monthly risk-free return, and 𝛼 captures the monthly risk-adjusted return. 
Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method allows firm risk to change over time. Following the 
literature (Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), cross-sectional regressions are estimated for each 
month after buyback announcements: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑡(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    𝑡 = 1,… . . ,36    (2) 
  Where i stands for each buyback firm, t denotes the number of months following an 
announcement date. 𝛼𝑡 captures risk-adjusted abnormal return in time t. 
 
2.2 Measuring Abnormal Investment & Operating Performance 
We measure a firm’s investment as the capital expenditure (item 145 in Compustat) 
divided by total assets (item 6).  We construct a control sample of non-repurchasing firms 
matched by investment, industry and size. For each repurchasing firm, the matched non-
repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both pre-repurchase investment 
and book value of assets in year -1 within ±20% of those of the repurchasing firm. Among 
those firms satisfying the above criteria, the matched firm is the one with the least deviations 
from the repurchasing firm.
9
 If no firms meet the criteria, we relax the industry criterion to 
one-digit SIC code. The abnormal investment of a repurchasing firm is defined as its capital-
expenditure-to-assets ratio minus that of its matched firm. 
Operating performance is measured as return on assets (ROA), which is defined as 
operating income before depreciation (item 13) divided by book assets at the beginning of the 
year (item 6). This is calculated over the eight quarters after the repurchase announcement 
                                                          
9
 The score function is defined as: 
(|Investmentyear−1,sample firm − Investmentyear−1,matched firm|)/Investmentyear−1,sample firm+ 
(|Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm − Total Assetsyear−1,matched firm|)/Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm  
10 
 
quarter (Lie (2005), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), Chen and Wang (2012)). Prior research 
(Fama and French (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000)) shows that pre-
announcement performance characteristics and market-to-book ratio predict future operating 
performance. Hence we select the matched sample of non-repurchasing firms based on prior 
operating performance, market-to-book ratio, industry and size.  
The non-repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both operating 
performance and market-to-book ratio in year -1 within ±20% of those of the repurchasing 
firm. In addition, the book value of assets for the matched firm in year -1 is also within ± 
20% of that of the repurchasing firm. If no firms meet the above criteria, we relax the 
industry criterion to one-digit SIC code or disregard the industry criterion if there is still no 
match. Among firms satisfying the above criteria, we select the matched firm as the one with 
the least deviations from the repurchasing firm.
10
 The abnormal operating performance for a 
repurchasing firm is defined as its ROA minus that of the matched firm.  
 
2.3 Measuring Growth Prospects 
To measure firms’ growth prospects, we follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and 
Viswanathan (2005) to decompose the market-to-book ratio into three components: 
     𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡⏟        )
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗⏟          )
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒−𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡⏟        
𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔−𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘
   (3) 
i stands for each firm, t denotes year and j accounts for industry. m is the market value of 
equity, b is the book value and v is a measure of fundamental value, all expressed in logs. 𝛼 is 
the regression coefficient. The fundamental value 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡) is to be estimated for firm i on 
                                                          
10
 This score function is defined as: 
(|ROAyear−1,sample firm − ROAyear−1,matched firm|)/ROAyear−1,sample firm+(|TAyear−1,sample firm −
TAyear−1,matched firm|)/TAyear−1,sample firm +(|M/Byear-1, sample firm-M/Byear-1, matched firm|)/M/Byear-1, sample firm 
11 
 
time t in industry j and 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) is an industry-specific long-run value that equals the industry 
average of 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗𝑡). 
The first term in equation (3) is the difference between the market value and the estimated 
fundamental value. It captures firm-specific error in market valuation. The second term 
reflects the difference between the estimated fundamental value on time t and industry j and 
the long-run sector-specific value. Hence it captures the time-series sector error. Our variable 
of interest is the third component: long-run value to book 𝑣𝑖𝑡(𝛼𝑗) − 𝑏𝑖𝑡. It is the difference 
between the long-run sector-specific fundamental value and the observed book value. It 
measures a firm’s growth prospects.  
To measure the last component, we follow Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan 
(2005), and estimate 𝛼 via the following regression based on Fama-French 12 industries: 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (4) 
Equation (4) is estimated annually for each industry j so that we have estimated 
coefficients 𝛼0𝑗𝑡  and 𝛼1𝑗𝑡  for each industry-year. ?̅?0𝑗  and ?̅?1𝑗are the average 𝛼0𝑗𝑡  and 𝛼1𝑗𝑡 
respectively over the sample period for each industry j. They are used to calculate the long-
run sector-specific fundamental value: 
𝑣𝑖𝑡(?̅?0𝑗 , ?̅?1𝑗) = ?̅?0𝑗 + ?̅?1𝑗𝑏𝑖𝑡     (5) 
The long-run value to book, i.e. the difference between 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑏𝑖𝑡, is our measure of a 
firm’s growth prospects. The higher the measure, the better the growth prospects. 
 
2.4 Measuring Target Leverage, Debt Capacity, Optimal Cash Ratio and Financial 
Distress Risk 
The target leverage ratios vary across firms and over time. Following Flannery and 
Rangan (2006) and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2012), we estimate the target 
leverage ratio for each firm per year using the following model:  
12 
 
𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (6) 
Where 𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is firm i’s market debt ratio, i.e. the book value of debt divided by the 
sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity, at year t+1, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of 
firm characteristics related to costs and benefits of adjusting the leverage ratio. They include 
EBIT_TA, MB, DEP_TA, LnTA, FA_TA, R&D_TA, R&D_DUM and Ind_median. 
EBIT_TA is earnings before interest and taxes, as a proportion of total assets. MB is market-
to-book ratio of assets. DEP_TA is depreciation as a proportion of total assets. LnTA is log of 
asset size, measured in 1983 dollars. FA_TA is fixed assets proportion to total assets. 
R&D_TA is R&D expenses as a proportion of total assets. R&D_DUM is a dummy variable 
that equals one if firm did not report R&D expenses. Ind_median is median industry market 
debt ratio calculated for each year based on the industry groupings in Fama and French 
(2002). After 𝛽 is estimated, the predicted value of 𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 is the target leverage ratio for 
firm i at year t+1. A firm is defined as over-levered (under-levered) if its actual market debt 
ratio is higher (lower) than the target debt ratio before the repurchase announcement. 
Following Lemmon and Zender (2010), our measure of debt capacity is based on the 
likelihood that a firm has access to public debt market. We estimate a logit model in which 
the dependent variable is one if a firm has debt rating in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Debt rating data are available in Compustat and our sample period is from 1994 to 2012. The 
explanatory variables include Ln_TA, ROA, PPE, MB, Leverage, Ln_Firm Age and Standard 
deviation of daily stock returns. Ln_TA is natural log of asset size. ROA is the ratio of 
operating profits to total assets. PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets. MB is market-to-book ratio of assets. Ln_Firm Age is the natural log of firm age 
where firm age is measured as the age of the firm relative to the first year the firm appears on 
Compustat. The estimated coefficients from the logit model are used to derive an estimated 
probability that a given firm could get a bond rating for each year during the sample period. 
13 
 
We divide our sample firms into three groups based on their estimated likelihood of gaining 
access to public debt market.
11
 Firms in the lowest (highest) tercile are defined as firms with 
low (high) debt capacity. 
Following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we estimate the optimal cash 
level for each firm in each year and define the excess cash of a firm as its cash holdings in 
excess of its optimal level of cash. In the regression to estimate the optimal cash level, the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of cash and short-term investments (item 1) divided by 
net assets, where net assets are defined as total assets (item 6) minus cash and short-term 
investments (item 1). The explanatory variables are those that affect firms’ cash expenditure 
and revenue, including the market-to-book ratio, size, cash flow, net working capital, capital 
expenditure, leverage, industry sigma (a measure of the volatility of an industry’s cash flow), 
R&D and a dividend dummy. Cash flow, net working capital and capital expenditure are 
divided by net assets. After the regression model is estimated, we calculate excess cash by 
taking the antilog of the residual of the regression model. 
A firm’s credit risk is measured by using Altman’s (1968) methodology. In particular, 
Altman’s Z-score is computed as: 
𝑍 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.4𝑋4 + 0.999𝑋5    (7) 
where X1 is working capital divided by book assets; X2 is retained earnings divided by 
book assets; X3 is earnings before interest and taxes divided by book assets; X4 is the market 
value of equity divided by total liabilities; and X5 is net sales divided by book assets. A lower 
Z-score indicates a higher financial distress risk. 
The abnormal Z-score for a repurchasing firm is its Z-score minus that of a matched non-
repurchasing peer. The matched firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and both the pre-
announcement Z-score and book value of assets in year -1 within ±20% of those of the 
                                                          
11
 We also divide our sample firms into two groups based on the ranking of their debt ratings. The results 
are similar to those reported here. 
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repurchasing firm. These factors are important in explaining the cross-sectional variation in 
corporate distress risk (Fama and French (1993)). If no firms meet these criteria, we relax the 
industry criterion to one-digit SIC code or disregard the industry criterion. Among these 
firms, the matched firm is selected as the one with the least deviations from the repurchasing 
firm.
12
 
 
2.5 Measuring Takeover Probability  
Bagwell (1991) suggests that repurchases might be used as a takeover deterrent. More 
recently, Bargeron, Bonaime and Thomas (2016), Lin, Stephens and Wu (2014) and Dittmar 
and Dittmar (2008) have shown a correlation between takeover risk, share repurchases and 
stock returns. 
We collect takeover data from SDC US Mergers and Acquisitions database to estimate 
the ex-ante takeover probability from 1993 to 2011. Following Cremers, Nair, and John 
(2009), we estimate a logit model where the dependent variable equals one if a firm is 
announced as a target in that year. The explanatory variables include an industry dummy that 
equals one if a takeover attempt occurred in the same industry in the year prior to the 
acquisition and zero otherwise, the return on assets, leverage, cash, firm size, Tobin’s Q, 
fixed assets, and a blockholder dummy that equals one when an institutional blockholder 
exists at the end of the previous year and zero otherwise. The estimated coefficients from the 
logit model are used to derive the ex-ante takeover probability that a firm could be acquired 
in a given year during our sample period. 
 
2.6  Buybacks Without Disclosed Sources of Financing 
                                                          
12
 This score function is 
(|Z_scoreyear−1,sample firm − Z_scoreyear−1,matched firm|)/Z_scoreyear−1,sample firm+ 
(|Total Assetsyear−1,sample firm
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Our sample includes share repurchases that explicitly state in the SEC filings that they use 
debt or cash to finance repurchases. As it is voluntary for firms to disclose their sources of 
financing, we collect 7,860 open-market share repurchases that do not disclose the sources of 
financing used to repurchase shares to account for the possibility that the disclosure is not 
random.
13
 We follow Heckman (1979) and conduct our multivariate analysis in a two-stage 
framework. First, we estimate a probit regression on firms’ decision to disclose the financing 
method used to repurchase shares based on a sample of both disclosing and non-disclosing 
repurchases. We use simulated marginal tax rate for each firm-year to capture a company’s 
tax motivation (Lin, Stephens, and Wu (2014).
14
 We also control for other firm 
characteristics, including firm age, prior CAR, Market-to-Book ratio, ROA, firm size, 
standard deviation of daily stock returns, the volatility of industry cash flows, and takeover 
probability. Bonaime (2012) shows that firms disclose more about repurchase transactions 
after 17 December 2003 when SEC Rule 10b-18 became effective.
15
 Hence we include a 
binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from 17 December 
2003 onwards. We also include industry and time dummies. In the second-stage regression, 
we include the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) estimated from the first-stage probit model as an 
additional explanatory variable in our multivariate regressions. 
 
2.7 Summary Statistics  
The distribution of our sample of share repurchases over time is presented in Table 1. 
There is relative small numbers of repurchases in the 1990’s.16 In most years of our sample 
                                                          
13
 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this. 
14
 We obtain marginal tax rates of individual firms from the website of John Graham. The link is 
https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/taxform.html 
15
 Rule 10b-18 of SEC became effective on 17 December 2003, which requires more detailed disclosure on 
the total number of shares purchased and the average price paid per share. 
16
 Our sample is smaller than that of previous research on repurchases (Grullon and Michaely (2004), Gong, 
Louis, and Sun (2008), Chen and Wang (2012)) as we require that the sources of financing of buybacks are 
disclosed. It is voluntary for firms to disclose the sources of financing used to repurchase shares.  
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period, the median deal size of debt-financed repurchases is larger than that of cash-financed 
ones.  
Table 2 reports the difference of pre-repurchase firm characteristics between debt- and 
cash-financed buybacks. Debt-financed repurchasing firms have higher capital expenditure 
ratios, lower cash, higher debt ratio and financial distress risk than cash-financed ones. Those 
firms are more mature with more assets in place, higher dividend payment, larger firm size, 
and better operating performance before conducting leveraged buybacks. The differences are 
statistically significant at, at least, the 10% level. Our summary statistics of firm 
characteristics are comparable to the literature (Lie (2005), Massa, Rehman, and Vermaelen 
(2007)).  
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Stock Performance Around Repurchases 
Table 3 presents the short-term market reaction and long-run stock return following share 
repurchase announcements for debt-financed, cash-financed, and non-disclosing repurchases. 
Panels A reports average CAR using value-weighted market index as the benchmark. We 
observe positive market reactions for both debt- and cash-financed repurchases. The average 
three-day announcement-period abnormal returns for debt-financed repurchases are 2.19%, 
which is lower than the average abnormal returns of 2.72% for cash-financed repurchases. 
Our three-day abnormal returns for cash-financed repurchases are comparable to those in 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), who report an average 2.71% three-day CAR using value-
weighted market index as the benchmark for cash-financed repurchases. The average three-
day abnormal returns are not statistically different between disclosing and non-disclosing 
repurchases.  
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The long-term price drift prior to and following repurchase programs is listed in Panels B 
and C. Long-term stock returns in Panel B are measured via a calendar-time portfolio 
approach where the Fama-French three factors are used as the benchmark. We observe 
negative monthly calendar-time alphas six months prior to buyback announcements for debt-
financed buybacks and the returns are significant (-46 basis points per month). Consistent 
with previous research (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009)), we find positive post-repurchase abnormal returns. The average monthly abnormal 
returns for debt-financed buybacks range from 76 basis points to 95 basis points per month, 
while cash-financed repurchases experience average abnormal returns of 55 basis points to 78 
basis points per month. For all repurchases that don’t disclose the sources of financing, the 
average post-repurchase monthly abnormal returns are 21 to 45 basis points lower than those 
of disclosing repurchases.  
To the extent that the calendar-time portfolio approach does not allow the factor loadings 
to change over time (Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), the observed positive abnormal return 
may be due to higher systematic risk ex post. Hence we re-estimate the long-term price drift 
using Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method, which allows for risk changes through time.  
Panel C exhibits negative monthly abnormal return six months prior to buyback 
announcements for debt-financed, cash-financed, and non-disclosing repurchases (-55 basis 
points, -103 basis points, and -77 basis points per month respectively). The results are 
consistent with Information/Timing hypothesis that underpriced firms initiate share 
repurchase (Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). After buybacks, the monthly abnormal returns are 
between 39 (44) basis points and 82 (67) basis points over 36 months for debt-financed (cash-
financed) repurchases. The positive abnormal returns suggest that debt-financed repurchases 
on average add value to shareholders.  
 
18 
 
3.2 Changes in Firm Performance Around Repurchases 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the average changes in investment, cash, leverage, net leverage, 
ROA and Z-score before repurchase announcements. Firms exhibit significant declines in 
cash and significant increases in operating performance before leveraged buyback 
announcements. Cash-financed buyback firms experience significant declines in investment 
and improved operating performance before buyback announcements. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the average changes in investment, cash, leverage, net leverage, 
ROA and Z-score between year -1 (the year before the repurchase announcement) and years 
+1, +2, +3, and +4 (i.e. the years after the repurchase announcement). Debt-financed buyback 
firms experience significant declines in investment, and operating performance and 
significant increases in leverage, net leverage and financial distress risk ex post. After the 
initial mechanical increases following buyback announcements, the debt ratio begins 
levelling off and remains 6.4% higher in four years than that before repurchase 
announcements. Cash-financed repurchasing firms experience significant declines in cash, 
and operating performance and significant increases in financial distress risk following 
buyback announcements. Consistent with Lie (2005) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), we 
observe a decline in ex-post operating performance for all buyback firms, before taking into 
account that of matched non-repurchasing peers. Figure 1 depicts changes of cash and 
leverage prior to and after repurchase announcements. 
 
3.3 Ex-ante Firm Characteristics: Leverage, Free Cash-Flows and Excess Cash  
The section studies how the effects of leveraged buybacks depend on ex-ante firm 
characteristics. First, ex-ante under-levered firms may adjust the debt ratio towards its 
optimal level via leveraged buybacks. We estimate the target debt ratio and find that 81% of 
debt-financed repurchasing firms are under-levered ex ante. For those under-levered firms, 
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the average pre-repurchase debt ratio (12%) is substantially below the average target debt 
ratio (27%). As a small segment of our sample, 19% of leveraged buybacks are conducted by 
firms that are estimated to be over-levered ex ante. 
Second, we divide our sample of leveraged buybacks into two subsamples: ex-ante over-
levered firms and under-levered ones. Table 5 reports the difference in firm performance and 
firm characteristics. Both over-levered firms and under-levered ones experience positive 
three-day abnormal returns (0.6% and 2.0% respectively), while those of over-levered firms 
are insignificant. Over-levered firms have negative but insignificant long-run stock 
performance, while that of under-levered firms is significantly positive under both the 
calendar-time portfolio approach and Ibbotson’s (1975) RATS method (90 basis points and 
80 basis points, respectively). The difference in long-run stock performance is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the benefits of leveraged buybacks decrease with a 
firm’s leverage ex ante. 
Third, we relate the market reactions to ex-ante firm characteristics in a multivariate 
regression framework using Heckman’s (1979) selection model. Panel A of Table 6 reports 
the coefficient estimates of the first-stage regression. We find that firms are more likely to 
voluntarily disclose the financing method after Dec 2003 when more detailed disclosure for 
repurchases became effective. Younger and smaller firms with lower prior returns, return 
volatility, marginal tax rate and ex-ante takeover probability are also more likely to disclose 
the source of financing.  
Panel B of Table 6 reports results of the second-stage regression. The LBB Dummy equals 
one for debt-financed repurchases and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the LBB Dummy in 
column (1) is positive but insignificant, which suggests that the short-term abnormal returns 
between debt-financed and cash-financed repurchases are not different statistically. 
Consistent with the agency cost of free cash-flows (Jensen (1986)), there is a less favorable 
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market reaction if the firm has substantial free cash-flows. Smaller and more levered firms 
with lower prior abnormal returns experience higher market reactions.  
The financial leverage increases mechanically following leveraged buybacks. We study 
whether the benefits from leveraged buybacks depend on the ex-ante debt ratio. In column 
(2), we interact the LBB Dummy with the Market Leverage. The coefficient on this interaction 
term is significantly negative at the 1% level. The LBB Dummy is significantly positive at the 
5% level, which suggests that market reacts favorably to debt-financed repurchasing firms 
with low debt ratio, In addition, for leveraged buybacks, firms with ex-ante high debt ratio 
experience lower abnormal returns than those with low debt ratio, consistent with the 
leverage optimization hypothesis.  
A firm with high debt ratio is not necessarily over-levered. The optimal capital structure 
varies across firms. In column (3), we add an interaction term, LBB Dummy × Over-levered 
Dummy to the regression, where Over-levered Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if 
the firm is over-levered before the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. For 
leveraged buybacks, we find that the average three-day abnormal return is lower if the firm is 
ex-ante over-levered. 
Fourth, we examine how free cash-flows and excess cash in a firm affect the impact of 
debt financing on the market reaction to repurchases. We include an interaction term, LBB 
Dummy × Free Cash Flow in column (4). The coefficient on the interaction term is 
insignificant. As the optimal cash holdings vary across firms, following Opler, Pinkowitz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we estimate the target cash holdings for each firm-year. We 
include an interaction term in column (5), LBB Dummy × Excess Cash Dummy, where Excess 
Cash Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if a firm’s cash ex ante is above the optimal 
level and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant. This 
suggests that free cash-flows or excess cash does not affect the impact of debt financing on 
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three-day abnormal returns. The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant across 
all specifications.  
Our results suggest that the market reacts favorably for ex-ante under-levered leveraged 
buyback firms. We find lower three-day announcement returns and poorer long-run stock 
performance for firms that are ex-ante over-levered.  
 
3.4 Ex-Post Real Investments 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that firms reduce their capital expenditures and R&D 
following repurchases. Table 7 shows the second-stage results of the cross-sectional analysis 
of changes in real investments ex post. The dependent variable is changes of abnormal 
investment, where abnormal investment is the capital expenditure of a repurchasing firm 
minus that of the matched peer with similar pre-buyback characteristics, from the end of year 
-1 to the end of year +2. In column (1), the coefficient of the LBB Dummy is significantly 
negative at the 10% level, which shows that debt-financed repurchasing firms experience 
sharper decline in ex-post abnormal investments than cash-financed ones. Post-repurchase 
capital expenditures are higher for firms with higher growth opportunities as proxied by 
Tobin’s Q, similar to findings in previous studies (Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach 
(2000)). Leverage is negatively associated with changes of abnormal investment (Lang, Ofek, 
and Stulz (1996)). Firms with more cash ex ante have higher post-repurchase real investments.  
In column (2), we include an interaction term, LBB Dummy × Leverage, to examine how 
leverage affects the impact of debt financing on post-repurchase real investments. The 
coefficient on the LBB Dummy is no longer significant but the coefficient on the interaction 
term is significantly negative at the 1% level. This suggests that leveraged buybacks lead to a 
sharper decline in ex-post abnormal investment only for highly-levered firms, not for firms 
with ex-ante low leverage.  
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We then investigate whether over-levered buybacks are associated with sharper decline in 
ex-post real investment than under-levered ones. Table 5 shows that both over-levered 
leveraged buyback firms and under-levered ones experience significant declines in 
investment after controlling for matched non-repurchasing peers. We observe a 5.5% (1.1%) 
decline in abnormal investments for over-levered (under-levered) firms, and the difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly in column (3) of Table 7, we include an 
interaction term LBB Dummy × Over-levered Dummy and the coefficient is significantly 
negative at the 10% level. For leveraged buybacks, post-repurchase abnormal investment 
declines more sharply for firms with leverage above the optimal ratio ex ante.  
To examine whether free cash-flows or excess cash affects the impact of debt financing 
on post-repurchase real investments, we first interact LBB Dummy with Free Cash Flow in 
column (4). The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly positive at the 10% level 
while LBB Dummy itself is significantly negative at the 1% level. This suggests that 
leveraged buyback firms with more free cash-flows ex ante have higher post-repurchase real 
investments. We interact LBB Dummy with Excess Cash Dummy in column (5) and it does 
not have a significant impact.  Our results indicate that leveraged buybacks experience a 
steeper decline in abnormal investments ex post than cash-financed ones. The reduction in 
real investments is sharper for ex-ante over-levered firms.  
 
3.5 Growth Prospects 
We analyze whether the reduction in real investments ex post is driven by declining 
growth prospects. For each repurchasing firm, the matched non-repurchasing firm is of the 
same two-digit SIC code, and with both pre-repurchase investment and book value of assets 
in year -1 within ±20% of those of the repurchasing firm.  
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Table 8 and Figure 1 report changes of growth prospects, measured by long-run value to 
book, prior to and following buyback announcements for debt-, cash-financed repurchases 
and their matched non-repurchasing peers. The average change in the long-run value to book 
from the end of year -1 to the end of year 0 is insignificant for both leveraged buybacks and 
their matched peers. From the end of year 0 to the end of year +4, only the change for 
leveraged buybacks is significantly negative, and the difference between the changes for 
leveraged buybacks and matched peers is statistically significant at the 1% level. Then we 
compare the changes in long-run value to book of debt-financed repurchases with those of 
cash-financed ones. Debt-financed buyback firms experience a significantly sharper decline 
in growth prospects than cash-financed buyback firms from the end of year 0 to the end of 
year +4.  
We next examine whether changes in growth prospects explain the lower returns and 
sharper decline in ex-post real investments for over-levered firms. Table 5 reports the 
changes in growth prospects from the end of year -1 to the end of year +2 for the subsamples 
of over-levered and under-levered firms. While under-levered firms experience significant 
decline in growth prospects following repurchase announcements, post-repurchase growth 
prospects for over-levered firms do not change significantly. Furthermore, we include growth 
prospects in our return and post-repurchase real investment regressions. We interact Growth 
Prospect with LBB Dummy in columns (1) and (3) of Table 9 and interact Change in Growth 
Prospect with LBB Dummy in columns (2) and (4). From columns (1) to (4), the LBB Dummy 
and Leverage interactions remain significant after controlling for growth prospects. These 
results suggest that growth prospects do not explain the lower announcement returns and ex-
post investments for firms with high leverage ex ante. 
Overall, our results suggest that the growth prospects decline significantly for all 
repurchasing firms ex post after controlling for non-repurchasing matched peers. The effect is 
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stronger for debt-financed buyback firms. Hence lower growth prospects may contribute to 
the post-repurchase reduction in real investments for leveraged buybacks. However, they do 
not explain the results for over-levered firms where announcement returns and ex-post real 
investments are lower. 
 
3.6 Can Corporate Governance Explain the Lower Returns of Over-Levered Firms? 
We next examine whether corporate governance explains the lower announcement returns 
and sharper decline in ex-post real investments for over-levered firms.  Following Gompers et 
al. (2003), we use G-Index to control for differences in corporate governance across firms. 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct an equally-weighted index based on 24 governance 
provisions provided by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). Higher G-Index 
proxies for weaker corporate governance. Among our sample of 575 repurchasing firms, data 
on G-Index is available for 357 firms.  
Table 5 reports G-Index at the end of year -1 for the subsamples of over-levered and 
under-levered firms. Over-levered firms have significantly weaker corporate governance than 
under-levered firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. In Table 10 
we then control for corporate governance in our regressions for announcement returns 
(columns (1) and (2)) and post-repurchase real investment (columns (3) and (4)). We interact 
G-Index with LBB Dummy in all columns and interact Leverage with LBB Dummy in columns 
(2) and (4). In column (1) of Table 10, the LBB and G-Index interaction is significantly 
negative, suggesting that weaker corporate governance is associated with lower abnormal 
returns for leveraged buyback firms. In column (2), LBB Dummy*G-Index remains 
significant, while LBB Dummy*Leverage becomes insignificant. This implies that weaker 
corporate governance explain the lower announcement returns for over-levered firms. 
25 
 
In our investment regressions in columns (3) and (4), the LBB and leverage interactions 
remain significant, while all interaction terms with G-Index are insignificant. This shows that 
weaker corporate governance do not explain the sharper decline in ex-post investments for 
over-levered firms. 
 
3.7 Motives and Completion Rates of Leveraged Buybacks  
We study why firms use debt to finance repurchases by employing logit and probit 
regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if firms use debt to 
fund repurchases and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables include one-year lagged firm 
characteristics. We include both industry and year dummies to account for potential industry-
specific and year-specific differences. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
Table 11 shows that firms with higher marginal tax rate are more likely to issue debt to 
repurchase shares as the tax advantage of debt is higher for these firms. Firms with lower 
excess cash are more likely to use debt to finance share buybacks. As the optimal cash 
holdings vary across firms, following Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), we 
estimate the target cash holdings for each firm-year. 73% of debt-financed repurchasing firms 
have ex-ante cash holdings below the estimated optimal cash level. This result supports a 
pecking order of financing where the firm raises external debt if internal cash is insufficient 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)).  
Furthermore, firms with more unused debt capacity are more likely to use debt to finance 
repurchases. In our sample, 74% of leveraged buyback firms belong to the substantial debt 
capacity group, while 48% of cash-financed buyback firms have substantial debt capacity ex 
ante. These results show that firms with lower cash but substantial unused debt capacity ex 
ante are more prone to take advantage of tax shield of debt via leveraged buybacks.  
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     Unlike repurchases via Dutch auction or tender offers, open-market repurchase programs 
do not commit to completing a pre-specified buyback program. Hence managers may use 
repurchase programs for their own interest (Fenn and Liang (2001), Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, 
and Wang (2010)).
17
 For leveraged buybacks, existing bondholders may deter the execution 
of repurchases due to an increased leverage.
18
 
We then examine the completion rate of debt-financed repurchases after repurchase 
announcements. To measure the completion rate of share repurchases, we use the purchase of 
common and preferred stock (item 115) minus any decrease in redeemable preferred stock 
(item 175) from Compustat, divided by the market value of equity (Grullon and Michaely 
(2004), Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008)).
19
 
In column (1) of Table 12, we employ the Tobit model where the dependent variable is 
the actual buyback ratio two years after the repurchase announcement. We include intended 
buyback ratio as additional explanatory variable in our regression. Intended buyback ratio is 
defined as the intended buyback size disclosed in the Current-Event (8-K) filing over the 
market value of equity (Chen and Wang (2012)). The coefficient on the LBB Dummy is 
statistically insignificant, which suggests that the completion rate between debt- and cash-
financed repurchases are not different statistically. Firms have higher completion rates after 
Dec 2003 when more detailed disclosure for repurchases became effective (Bonaime, 2015). 
                                                          
17
 Bonaime (2012) finds a reputation effect where the lagged completion rate predicts future completion 
rates of buybacks.   
18
 This is possibly due to interventions from debtholders. For example, Bloomberg reports on 17 April 
2012: “Lowe’s Cos. (LOW) is raising $2 billion in the bond market to finance stock repurchases as the second-
biggest U.S. home-improvement retailer boosts leverage to reward shareholders even as its profitability wanes. 
That raises concern among bondholders and bondholders are somewhat skeptical of the company given that the 
firm changed its financial policies. Debtholders tend to negotiate with the senior officials in order to avoid 
worsen financial position of the company.”   
19 Several proxies are proposed by previous research to measure actual buyback ratio. Fama and French 
(2001) select changes in treasury stock from Compustat to proxy for actual repurchase rate. Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) and Guay and Harford (2000) use decreases in shares outstanding from CRSP to measure 
actual buyback ratio. Banyi, Dyl, and Kahle (2008) show that purchase of common and preferred stock minus 
any decrease in redeemable preferred stock from Compustat is considered a better measure. 
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Firms with ex-ante higher takeover probability are more likely to complete ex post, which is 
consistent with share repurchases act as a takeover defense (Billett and Xue, 2007).  
In column (2), we interact LBB Dummy with Over-levered Dummy and find that the 
interaction term is significantly positive at the 1% level while LBB Dummy itself is 
significantly negative at the 10% level. This suggests that for leveraged buybacks, ex-ante 
over-levered firms have higher completion rate ex post. The results are similar when we use 
Heckman’s (1979) selection model in columns (3) and (4).  
 
3.8 Operating Performance, Financial Distress Risk and Robustness Checks 
We first examine whether operating performance improves following debt-financed 
repurchases. Figure 2 depicts changes of operating performance following repurchase 
announcements for debt- and cash-financed buybacks and their matched peers. Consistent 
with Lie (2005) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), we find lower reductions in operating 
performance ex post for debt- and cash-financed repurchases than matched non-repurchasing 
firms. We then test whether the abnormal post-repurchase operating performance differs 
between debt- and cash-financed buybacks, controlling for other factors in a regression 
setting. The dependent variable is changes of abnormal operating performance from the end 
of year -1 to the end of year +2. We do not find significant difference in ex-post abnormal 
operating performance between debt- and cash-financed buybacks (Tables are available upon 
request). 
We next analyze whether debt-financed buyback firms face higher financial distress risk 
ex post than their matched non-repurchasing peers. Shareholders may use buybacks to 
expropriate wealth from debtholders (Bradley and Wakeman (1983), Maxwell and Stephens 
(2003)). For instance, Greenberg reports on 8th November 2011: “Fitch Rating downgraded 
Amgen the day when the firm announced that it would use debt to finance the repurchase.” 
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Figure 2 plots changes of Z-score following buyback announcements for debt-financed, cash-
financed repurchases and their matched non-repurchasing peers. Debt-financed buyback 
firms do not exhibit higher financial distress risk than their matched peers. We also run 
regression where the dependent variable is changes of abnormal Z-score from the end of year 
-1 to the end of year +2. The coefficient of the LBB Dummy is negative but insignificant. We 
do not find significant difference of abnormal changes of financial distress risk ex post 
between debt- and cash-financed buybacks (Tables are available upon request). 
We also conduct several robustness checks to our main results. First, we use an 
alternative definition of debt-financed repurchases. We define a repurchase as a debt-financed 
one only if the corporate filings explicitly state that the firm expects to use only debt to 
finance the share repurchase. In our sample, 83 out of 218 leveraged buybacks are fully 
financed by debt. We investigate short-term market reaction to those fully-debt financed 
repurchases. We find similar results to those reported before. 
Second, we use alternative measures of abnormal returns. For example, we use a five-day 
window in CAR. We also use alternative models such as the CRSP equally-weighted market 
index as the benchmark or market-adjusted returns where equity beta is assumed to be 1. The 
results are very similar to those reported in Table 6. 
Third, an alternative measure of the completion rate is employed. Following Bonaime 
(2012), we use the purchase of common and preferred stock minus any decrease in 
redeemable preferred stock, all scaled by the announced size of repurchase plan to measure 
the completion rate.
20
 Results remain unchanged. 
 
4. Conclusion 
                                                          
20
 Results are similar when we drop the decrease in redeemable preferred stock item.  
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This paper studies the performance of leveraged buybacks. We propose that firms 
conduct leveraged buybacks to optimize their capital structures. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, under-levered firms with substantial debt capacity, high marginal tax rate, low 
excess cash, and low growth prospects conduct leveraged buybacks to take advantage of tax 
shield of debt. We find positive short-term abnormal returns and long-term price drift for 
debt-financed repurchases. Leveraged buyback firms experience a steeper decline in real 
investments ex post than cash-financed buyback firms, which may relate to their differences 
in growth prospects.  
The stock market reacts less favorably to ex-ante over-levered firms, consistent with the 
informational, agency and tax benefits of leveraged buybacks decreasing with a firm’s 
leverage. Lower growth prospects do not explain the lower announcement returns and ex-post 
real investments that are associated with ex-ante over-levered firms. Instead, we find that the 
lower announcement returns for over-levered firms are concentrated on firms with weaker 
corporate governance. Debt-financed buyback firms do not have significantly different 
financial distress risk, operating performance, or completion rate ex post than cash-financed 
ones.  
Our results suggest that leveraged buybacks on average add value to shareholders. Firms 
with declining growth prospects and substantial debt capacity repurchase shares via issuing 
debt to generate tax benefits or reduce agency costs of free cash-flows, therefore optimizing 
their leverage. However, the evidence does not imply that all leveraged buybacks are 
consistent with value maximization and economic efficiency. In a small segment of the 
leveraged buyback market where firms are over-levered ex-ante, leveraged buybacks lead to 
lower market reactions and sharper reductions in ex-post investments than under-levered 
firms. 
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Table 1 The Distribution of Share Repurchases Over Time 
This table lists the number of debt- and cash-financed repurchases each year over the period 1994-2012. 
Debt-financed repurchases are share buybacks that use external debt to buyback stocks. We define a 
share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. Cash-
financed repurchases are repurchase programs that use internal funds to finance share buybacks. We also 
report the mean (median) deal value for both debt- and cash-financed repurchases. 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases 
Year N 
Mean Deal 
Value ($million) 
Median Deal  
Value ($million) 
 
N 
Mean Deal 
Value ($million) 
Median Deal 
Value ($million) 
1994 12 81.30 25.75  13 41.93 9.40 
1995 19 115.85 34.68  6 13.25 9.09 
1996 14 133.78 43.67  12 113.81 24.53 
1997 17 229.30 47.81  10 124.42 6.32 
1998 16 36.16 17.76  10 401.69 19.22 
1999 17 48.41 15.70  6 53.47 63.89 
2000 4 91.47 47.50  4 9.80 8.15 
2001 7 114.23 53.28  7 78.64 11.49 
2002 8 104.84 33.00  13 297.15 9.60 
2003 3 70.02 38.50  4 46.69 41.65 
2004 7 869.66 100.00  28 318.55 101.38 
2005 13 361.70 300.00  26 311.76 57.5 
2006 12 411.37 250.00  27 228.59 25.52 
2007 35 1001.39 150.00  62 253.43 55.00 
2008 29 146.48 46.30  102 390.16 20.00 
2009 10 161.65 63.00  27 167.49 25.00 
2010 6 300.40 212.50  9 348.38 15.00 
2011 31 470.91 100.00  37 132.09 50.00 
2012 17 426.47 200.00  30 756.96 250.00 
Total 277 335.21 70.00  433 291.39 30.00 
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Table 2 Sources of Financing and Firm Characteristics 
The sample consists of 218 debt-financed open-market share repurchases and 357 cash-financed open-market share repurchases over the period 1994-2012. 
Investment is defined as capital expenditure (item 145 in Compustat) divided by total assets (item 6). Cash is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total 
assets (item 6). Market Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market 
value of equity (item 25* item 24). Net Market Leverage is the book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) minus cash and cash equivalents (item 1), all divided by 
the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity(item 25* item 24). Intended Buyback Ratio is the intended buyback size disclosed 
in the 8-k filing over the market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Z-score is Altman’s (1968) measure of credit risk. Dividend is the sum of common (item 
21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total assets (item 6). Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value 
of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 
6), measured in 1983 dollars. ROA is defined as operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). FA_TA is the property, plant and equipment 
(item 14) over total book assets (item 6). Takeover Probability is the predicted probability of being acquired one year before the repurchase announcement 
from the probit regression. The last column reports the difference in mean test. ***, **and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases  Difference 
 N Mean Median  N Mean Median  Debt - Cash 
Investment 210 0.066 0.038  336 0.045 0.032  0.021***
 
Cash  212 0.093 0.040  341 0.250 0.223  -0.157***
 
Market Leverage 210 0.196 0.145  339 0.136 0.070  0.060***
 
Net Market Leverage 210 0.140 0.107  339 -0.036 -0.047  0.176***
 
Intended Buyback Ratio 211 0.120 0.077  337 0.130 0.068  -0.010
 
Z-score 199 4.476 3.761  325 6.237 4.147  -1.761***
 
Dividend 218 0.010 0.002  357 0.008 0.000  0.002*
 
Tobin’s Q 211 1.994 1.688  341 2.186 1.673  -0.192 
Size 218 6.350 6.223  357 5.848 5.876  0.502***
 
ROA 212 0.174 0.153  340 0.129 0.125  0.045***
 
FA_TA 218 0.287 0.200  357 0.199 0.112  0.088***
 
Takeover Probability 218 0.095 0.093  357 0.095 0.094  0.000 
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Table 3: Short-Term and Long-Run Stock Performance 
This table shows the short-term market reaction and long-term price drift for debt-financed, cash-financed, and non-disclosing repurchases. Panel A shows the 
cumulative abnormal return based on different event windows. We use market model and select value-weighted (VW) market index as the benchmark. Panel B 
reports the monthly calendar-time alphas 6-month prior to and 12-, 24-, and 36-month following the repurchase announcement date, where portfolios are formed 
monthly in calendar time. Panel C shows the monthly abnormal returns 6-month prior to and 12-, 24-, and 36-month following the repurchase announcement using 
Ibbotson’s (1975) Return Across Time and Securities (RATS) method. The last column reports the difference between disclosing repurchases and non-disclosing 
repurchases in mean test.  ***, **and *represent the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Panel A: Short-term CAR 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases  All disclosing Repurchases  Non-disclosing Repurchases  Difference 
 N VW  N VW  N VW  N VW  ALL-Non 
(-1,0) 269 1.04%***
 
 403 1.30%***
 
 672 1.19%***
 
 7,548 1.33%***
 
 -0.14% 
(0,1) 269 2.21%***
 
 403 2.90%***
 
 672 2.63%***
 
 7,548 2.39%***
 
 0.24% 
(-1,+1) 269 2.19%***
 
 403 2.72%***
 
 672 2.50%***
 
 7,548 2.20%***
 
 0.30% 
Panel B: Fama-French Calendar-Time Long-term AR 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases  All disclosing Repurchases  Non-disclosing Repurchases  Difference 
 
N 
Calendar-time 
Approach 
 N 
Calendar-time 
Approach 
 N 
Calendar-time 
Approach 
 N 
Calendar-time 
Approach 
 
ALL-Non 
(-6,0) 273 -0.46%*
 
 409 -0.68%**
 
 682 -0.69%**  7,684 -0.37%***  -0.32%*** 
(0,+12) 273 0.95%***
 
 409 0.78%***
 
 682 0.79%***  7,684 0.34%***  0.45%*** 
(0,+24) 273 0.80%***
 
 409 0.59%***
 
 682 0.64%***  7,684 0.33%***  0.32%*** 
(0,+36) 273 0.76%***
 
 409 0.55%***
 
 682 0.56%***  7,684 0.35%***  0.21%*** 
Panel C: Fama-French IRATS Long-term AR 
 Debt-Financed Repurchases  Cash-Financed Repurchases  All disclosing Repurchases  Non-disclosing Repurchases  Difference 
 N Ibbotson RATS  N Ibbotson RATS  N Ibbotson RATS  N Ibbotson RATS  ALL-Non 
(-6,0) 273 -0.55%**  409 -1.03%***  682 -0.73%***  7,684 -0.77%***  0.04% 
(0,+12) 273 0.82%***  409 0.67%***  682 0.73%***  7,684 0.50%***  0.23%*** 
(0,+24) 273 0.49%**  409 0.51%***  682 0.51%***  7,684 0.46%***  0.05%*** 
(0,+36) 273 0.39%**  409 0.44%***  682 0.43%***  7,684 0.44%***  -0.01% 
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Table 4 Changes in Investment, Cash, Leverage, Net Leverage, ROA and Z-score Around Buybacks  
This table reports average changes in investment, cash, leverage, net leverage, ROA and Z-score before and after repurchase announcements. Panel A shows changes 
ex ante and Panel B displays changes ex post. Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase is announced. Period (x, y) measures changes from the end 
of year y to the end of year x. Investment is defined as capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6). Cash is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) 
over total assets (item 6). Market Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market 
value of equity (item 25* item 24). Net Market Leverage is the book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) minus cash and cash equivalents (item 1), all divided by the sum 
of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). ROA is defined as operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). 
Z-score is Altman’s (1968) measure of credit risk. ***, **and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Ex-ante changes  
Category Period Change in INV Change in CASH Change in LEV Change in NLEV Change in ROA Change in Z-score 
Debt-Financed Repurchases (-2,-1) 0.001 -0.004** -0.007 -0.004 0.007* 0.127 
 (-3,-1) -0.000 -0.012** -0.022* -0.008 0.010** 0.274 
 (-4,-1) -0.000 -0.015*** -0.022 -0.012 0.018** 0.141 
 (-5,-1) -0.002 -0.025*** -0.001 0.011 0.017** -0.356 
        
Cash Financed Repurchases (-2,-1) -0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.007 0.010* 0.205 
 (-3,-1) -0.005** -0.001 -0.004 -0.012 0.018** 0.213 
 (-4,-1) -0.009*** 0.007 -0.010 -0.030** 0.028*** -0.204 
 (-5,-1) -0.006** -0.003 -0.028*** -0.042*** 0.019** -1.572*** 
Panel B: Ex-post changes  
Category Period Change in INV Change in CASH Change in LEV Change in NLEV Change in ROA Change in Z-score 
Debt-Financed Repurchases (-1,+1) -0.012** -0.001 0.084*** 0.068*** -0.003 -0.884*** 
 (-1,+2) -0.021*** 0.002 0.061*** 0.044*** -0.013* -1.016*** 
 (-1,+3) -0.020*** 0.008 0.064*** 0.038** -0.019** -1.093*** 
 (-1,+4) -0.020*** 0.013* 0.064*** 0.033 -0.031*** -1.354*** 
        
Cash-Financed Repurchases (-1,+1) 0.001 -0.028*** 0.021** 0.011 -0.018** -1.469*** 
 (-1,+2) -0.001 -0.032*** 0.014 0.001 -0.014* -1.418*** 
 (-1,+3) -0.005* -0.035*** 0.036*** -0.008 -0.022** -2.068*** 
 (-1,+4) -0.001 -0.035*** 0.026* -0.022 -0.017* -2.163*** 
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Table 5 Leveraged Buybacks and Firm Performance: Over-levered vs Under-levered Firms 
This table disentangles over-levered leveraged buyback firms from under-levered ones. The leveraged buyback firm is defined as over-levered if its market 
leverage exceeds the optimal level one year before the repurchase announcement. Following Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, 
and Smith (2012), we estimate the target leverage ratio for each firm per year. CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return (-1, +1) where day 0 is the 
repurchase announcement date. Fama-French Calendar-time AR is the monthly calendar-time alphas 12 months following the repurchase announcement date, 
where portfolios are formed monthly in calendar time. Ibbotson RATS AR is the monthly abnormal returns 12 months following the repurchase announcement 
using Ibbotson’s (1975) Return Across Time and Securities (RATS) method. Debt Capacity is the likelihood that a firm has access to public debt market. Excess 
Cash is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has excess cash prior to the buyback announcement and zero otherwise. We follow Gompers et al. (2003) 
and construct G-Index based on 24 governance provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). High G-Index indicates weak corporate 
governance. We calculate Changes in Abnormal Investment, Abnormal Operating Performance, Abnormal Z-score, and Growth Prospect from the end of year -1 
to the end of year +2. Abnormal Investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of its matched 
firm. The Abnormal Operating Performance for a repurchasing firm is its ROA, which is defined as operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6) 
minus that of the matched firm. The Abnormal Z-score for the repurchasing firm is the firm specific Z-score minus that of the matched firm. Growth Prospect is 
the difference between long-run value and observed book value. The last column reports the difference in mean test. ***, ** and *
 
represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 Over-levered Firms  Under-levered Firms  Difference 
 N Mean  N Mean  Over - Under 
CAR 40 0.006  141 0.020***  -0.014 
Fama-French Calendar-time AR (+1,+12) 40 -0.001  143 0.009***  -0.008*** 
Ibbotson RATS AR (+1,+12) 40 -0.002  143 0.008***  -0.010*** 
Debt Capacity 41 0.461***  127 0.368***  0.093 
Excess Cash 42 0.238***  132 0.265***  -0.027 
G-Index 24 9.167***  112 7.848***  1.319** 
Changes in Abnormal Investment 37 -0.055***  131 -0.011**  -0.044*** 
Changes in Abnormal Operating Performance 36 0.014  131 0.058**  -0.044 
Changes in Abnormal Z-score 34 0.116  123 -1.004***  1.120* 
Changes in Growth Prospect 36 -0.003  135 -0.048***  0.045*** 
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Table 6 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Short Term Reaction to Buyback Announcements 
This table reports Heckman’s (1979) two-stage results to correct for potential selection bias due to the non-randomness of 
our repurchase sample. In the first stage (Panel A), we investigate which firms are more likely to disclose their source of 
financing to repurchase shares. In the second stage (Panel B), we include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-
stage probit model and report the cross-sectional results of short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements. In 
Panel A, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm discloses the source used to finance share 
repurchase and zero otherwise. Marginal Tax Rate is the simulated corporate marginal tax rate based on income after 
interest expense has been deducted. High Disclosure Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the repurchase 
announcement is made from Dec 2003 onwards and zero otherwise. Firm Age is the natural log of firm age where firm 
age is measured as the age of the firm relative to the first year the firm appears on Compustat. Prior CAR is the stock 
returns on the firm minus returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, calculated from 44 days prior to the announcement 
until 4 days prior to the announcement. MB is the book value of debt (item 9+item 34) plus preferred stock liquidating 
value (item10) plus market value of equity (item 25*item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). ROA is the 
operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 
1983 dollars. SD of Stock Return is the standard deviation of daily stock returns. Industry Sigma is a measure of the 
volatility of an industry’s cash flow. Takeover Probability is the percentage of the predicted probability of being acquired 
one year before the repurchase announcement from the probit regression. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the three-
day CAR (-1, +1) where day 0 is the repurchase announcement date. LBB Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if 
the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction 
is partially or fully financed by debt. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity 
(item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). Cash is the cash 
and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Free Cash Flow is the gross operating income (item 13) minus the 
sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 21). 
Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) 
and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Fixed Assets is the property, plant and equipment (item 14) over total book 
assets (item 6). Dividend is the sum of common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total 
assets (item 6). Over-levered Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is over-levered before the repurchase 
announcement and zero otherwise. Excess Cash Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has excess cash 
prior to the buyback announcement and zero otherwise. We include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble 
from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 industry dummy variables based on 
Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: First-Stage Regressions 
                   Probit                     Logit 
Marginal Tax Rate -1.432 -2.617 
 [6.77]*** [6.74]*** 
High Disclosure Dummy 0.354 0.613 
 [2.76]*** [2.65]*** 
Firm Age -0.189 -0.339 
 [3.69]*** [3.67]*** 
Prior CAR -0.402 -0.681 
 [2.23]** [2.10]** 
MB 0.007 0.013 
 [0.23] [0.24] 
ROA 0.210 0.361 
 [0.56] [0.55] 
Size -0.044 -0.074 
 [1.95]* [1.82]* 
SD of Stock Return -7.847 -13.014 
 [3.01]*** [2.75]*** 
Industry Sigma 0.112 0.163 
 [0.55] [0.45] 
Takeover Probability -0.067 -0.141 
 [1.91]* [2.22]** 
Industry Dummies                     Yes                      Yes 
Year Dummies                     Yes                      Yes 
Constant 0.666 1.462 
 [1.72]* [2.10]** 
N                    2,968                     2,968 
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Panel B: Second-Stage Regressions 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
LBB Dummy 0.006 0.029 0.022 -0.007 -0.008 
 [0.54] [2.04]** [1.91]* [0.56] [0.60] 
High Disclosure 
Dummy 
0.010 0.010 0.022 0.009 0.022 
[0.47] [0.44] [0.95] [0.41] [0.87] 
Prior CAR -0.147 -0.143 -0.153 -0.146 -0.166 
 [5.92]*** [5.77]*** [6.00]*** [5.86]*** [6.23]*** 
Tobin’s Q -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 
 [1.62] [1.47] [1.40] [1.62] [1.77]* 
Size -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008 
 [1.75]* [2.01]** [2.86]*** [1.75]* [2.16]** 
Cash 0.027 0.030 0.043 0.024 0.067 
 [0.82] [0.91] [1.22] [0.72] [1.48] 
Free Cash Flow -0.120 -0.126 -0.080 -0.165 -0.086 
 [1.70]* [1.80]* [1.11] [2.18]** [1.15] 
Leverage 0.098 0.148 0.252 0.103 0.129 
 [3.19]*** [4.00]*** [4.92]*** [3.33]*** [3.76]*** 
Fixed Assets -0.010 -0.014 -0.046 -0.012 -0.020 
 [0.38] [0.52] [1.66]* [0.45] [0.70] 
Dividend 0.460 0.429 0.586 0.462 0.527 
 [1.56] [1.46] [1.95]* [1.57] [1.69]* 
Takeover 
Probability 
0.004 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.005 
[0.60] [0.56] [0.98] [0.55] [0.77] 
LBB Dummy* 
Leverage 
 -0.126    
 [2.40]***    
Over-levered  
Dummy 
  -0.032   
  [1.41]   
LBB Dummy* 
Over-levered  
  -0.079   
  [3.24]***   
LBB Dummy*Free 
Cash Flows 
   0.217  
   [1.60]  
Excess Cash 
Dummy 
    -0.019 
    [1.21] 
LBB Dummy* 
Excess Cash  
    0.017 
    [0.75] 
Lambda -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
 [0.14] [0.23] [0.31] [0.25] [0.25] 
Industry Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes          Yes          Yes 
Year Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes          Yes          Yes 
Constant 0.012 0.014 -0.016 0.020 0.012 
 [0.18] [0.22] [0.23] [0.29] [0.17] 
N           523           523          471          523          455 
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Table 7 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Changes in Post-Repurchase Real Investments 
We conduct Heckman’s (1979) two-stage analysis to correct for potential selection bias due to the non-randomness of our 
repurchase sample. This table shows the second-stage results which we include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the 
first-stage probit model and report results of the cross-sectional analysis of post-announcement changes in abnormal 
investment. The dependent variable is changes in abnormal investment from the end of year -1 to the end of year +2. 
Abnormal investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of 
its matched firm. LBB Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. 
We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. High 
Disclosure Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from Dec 2003 onwards 
and zero otherwise. Prior CAR is the stock returns on the firm minus returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, 
calculated from 44 days prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is defined as the 
book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all 
divided by book value of assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Cash is 
the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Free Cash Flow is the gross operating income (item 13) 
minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 
21). Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 
34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Takeover Probability is the percentage of the predicted probability of 
being acquired one year before the repurchase announcement from the probit regression. Industry Sigma is a measure of 
the volatility of an industry’s cash flow. Over-levered Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is over-
levered before the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. Excess Cash Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 
one if the firm has excess cash prior to the buyback announcement and zero otherwise. We include two time dummies 
capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 industry 
dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level, respectively. 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
LBB Dummy -0.012 0.005 -0.006 -0.022 -0.005 
 [1.74]* [0.56] [0.72] [2.56]*** [0.56] 
High Disclosure 
Dummy 
0.005 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.012 
[0.32] [0.25] [0.71] [0.23] [0.74] 
Prior CAR -0.044 -0.039 -0.044 -0.041 -0.049 
 [2.38]** [2.12]** [2.22]** [2.21]** [2.38]** 
Tobin’s Q 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 [1.99]** [2.08]** [1.99]** [1.97]** [1.86]* 
Size 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
 [0.52] [0.17] [0.37] [0.54] [0.18] 
Cash  0.099 0.102 0.126 0.097 0.130 
 [4.58]*** [4.74]*** [5.30]*** [4.50]*** [4.28]*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.121 -0.122 -0.145 -0.155 -0.152 
 [2.90]*** [2.94]*** [3.30]*** [3.42]*** [3.43]*** 
Leverage -0.043 -0.006 -0.023 -0.040 -0.056 
 [2.08]** [0.25] [0.69] [1.96]* [2.40]** 
Takeover Probability -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
[1.74]* [1.69]* [1.29] [1.74]* [1.23] 
Industry Sigma -0.003 -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.017 
 [0.18] [0.26] [0.64] [0.27] [0.77] 
LBB Dummy* 
Leverage 
 -0.096    
 [2.69]***    
Over-levered 
Dummy 
  -0.000   
  [0.03]   
LBB Dummy*Over-
levered Dummy 
  -0.028   
  [1.86]*   
LBB Dummy*Free 
Cash Flow 
   0.170  
   [1.89]*  
Excess Cash Dummy     0.000 
     [0.05] 
LBB Dummy*Excess 
Cash Dummy 
    -0.020 
    [1.38] 
Lambda -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 [0.15] [0.36] [0.31] [0.34] [0.17] 
Industry Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Year Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Constant 0.116 0.118 0.108 0.122 0.104 
 [2.72]*** [2.79]*** [2.37]** [2.86]*** [2.20]** 
N           496           496           456            496            445 
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Table 8 Changes of Growth Prospects After Share Buybacks 
This table reports average changes of growth prospects, measured by long-run value to book (Rhodes-Kropf, 
Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005). Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase is announced. Period 
(x, y) measures changes from the end of year y to the end of year x. Long-run value to book is the difference 
between long-run value and observed book value and accounts for firm’s growth prospects. Both debt- and cash-
financed repurchases are matched to non-repurchasing peers with similar pre-repurchase firm characteristics. For 
each repurchasing firm, the matched non-repurchasing firm is of the same two-digit SIC code, and with both pre-
repurchase investment and book value of assets in year -1 within ±20% of those of the repurchasing firm. Tests of 
differences and difference-in-difference are reported. 
***
, 
**
and 
* 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
Category (-1,0) (0,+1) (0,+2) (0,+3) (0,+4) 
Debt-financed Repurchases -0.004 -0.007 -0.017 -0.027 -0.038 
 [1.52] [3.57]***
 
[3.84]***
 
[4.25]***
 
[5.31]***
 
Matched Non-repurchasing Firms 0.006 0.014 0.016 0.011 -0.006 
 [1.11] [1.09] [1.00] [0.48] [0.46] 
Difference (1) -0.010 -0.021 -0.033 -0.038 -0.044 
 [0.83] [2.42]***
 
[2.79]***
 
[3.64]***
 
[4.71]***
 
Cash-financed Repurchases -0.003 -0.005 -0.012 -0.015 -0.026 
 [1.51] [2.78]***
 
[3.43]***
 
[2.41]***
 
[4.26]***
 
Matched Non-repurchasing Firms 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
 [0.21] [0.38] [0.50] [0.82] [0.49] 
Difference (2) -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 -0.021 
 [1.02] [2.39]***
 
[3.11]***
 
[2.25]**
 
[3.73]***
 
Diff-in-Diff (1)-(2) -0.006 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030 -0.023 
 [0.77] [2.51]***
 
[2.86]***
 
[2.38]***
 
[3.04]***
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Table 9 The Effect of Growth Prospect on Market Reaction and Post-Repurchase Investments 
We conduct Heckman’s (1979) two-stage analysis to correct for potential selection bias due to the non-randomness of our repurchase 
sample. This table shows the second-stage results which we include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-stage probit model and 
report the effect of growth prospects on short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements and post-repurchase real investments. 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the three day CAR (-1, +1) where day 0 is the repurchase announcement date. The 
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is changes in abnormal investment from the end of year -1 to the end of year +2. Abnormal 
investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6), minus that of its matched firm. LBB 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a 
debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. High Disclosure Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if 
the repurchase announcement is made from Dec 2003 onwards and zero otherwise. Prior CAR is the stock returns on the firm minus 
returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, calculated from 44 days prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to the announcement. 
Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 
24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Cash is the 
cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Free Cash Flow is the gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of 
depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 21). Leverage is defined as book 
value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). 
Takeover Probability is the percentage of the predicted probability of being acquired one year before the repurchase announcement from 
the probit regression. Fixed Assets is the property, plant and equipment (item 14) over total book assets (item 6). Dividend is the sum of 
common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total assets (item 6). Industry Sigma is a measure of the 
volatility of an industry’s cash flow. Growth Prospect is the difference between long-run value and observed book value one year prior to 
the repurchase announcement. Change in Growth Prospect is changes in growth prospects from the end of year -1 to the end of year +2. 
We include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also 
include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 (1)             (2)             (3)            (4) 
LBB Dummy 0.042 0.034 -0.000 -0.006 
 [2.27]** [2.35]** [0.02] [0.70] 
High Disclosure Dummy 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.009 
[0.36] [0.55] [0.81] [0.68] 
Prior CAR -0.137 -0.139 -0.040 -0.039 
 [5.77]*** [5.79]*** [2.34]** [2.29]** 
Tobin’s Q -0.008 -0.007 0.006 0.007 
 [1.99]** [1.53] [2.40]** [2.68]*** 
Size -0.006 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 
 [0.56] [2.26]** [0.13] [0.07] 
Cash 0.046 0.058 0.103 0.105 
 [1.48] [1.80]* [5.14]*** [5.26]*** 
Free Cash Flow -0.095 -0.060 -0.118 -0.105 
 [1.43] [0.88] [3.01]*** [2.64]*** 
Leverage 0.150 0.155 -0.012 -0.016 
 [4.17]*** [4.29]*** [0.51] [0.69] 
Takeover Probability 0.001 0.004 -0.007 -0.006 
 [0.03] [0.16] [1.78]* [1.76]* 
Fixed Assets 0.430 0.485   
 [1.52] [1.71]*   
Dividend 0.004 0.005   
 [0.61] [0.86]   
Industry Sigma   -0.021 -0.023 
   [1.33] [1.45] 
Growth Prospect 0.005  0.006  
 [0.07]  [0.13]  
Change in Growth 
Prospect 
 0.185  0.104 
 [2.13]**  [1.88]* 
LBB Dummy*Leverage -0.134 -0.136 -0.086 -0.071 
 [2.61]*** [2.48]** [2.53]** [2.08]** 
LBB Dummy Growth 
Prospect 
-0.017  0.002  
[0.54]  [0.09]  
LBB Dummy*Change in 
Growth Prospect 
 -0.196  -0.180 
 [1.48]  [2.18]** 
Lambda -0.009 -0.011 -0.004 -0.006 
 [0.42] [0.51] [0.31] [0.43] 
Industry Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Year Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Constant 0.020 0.009 0.109 0.121 
 [0.16] [0.14] [1.47] [3.14]*** 
R2 0.15 0.17 0.37 0.37 
N           531           527           526           525 
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Table 10  The Effect of Corporate Governance on Market Reaction and Post-Repurchase Investments 
We conduct Heckman’s (1979) two-stage analysis to correct for potential selection bias due to the non-randomness of our 
repurchase sample. This table shows the second-stage results which we include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-
stage probit model and report the effect of corporate governance on short-term market reaction to repurchase announcements and 
post-repurchase real investments. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the three day CAR (-1, +1) where day 0 is the 
repurchase announcement date. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is changes in abnormal investment from the end of 
year -1 to the end of year +2. Abnormal investment is a repurchasing firm’s capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets 
(item 6), minus that of its matched firm. LBB Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and 
zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. High 
Disclosure Dummy is a binary variable that equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from Dec 2003 onwards and zero 
otherwise. Prior CAR is the stock returns on the firm minus returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, calculated from 44 days 
prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus 
book value of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). Size is 
defined as the log of asset size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Cash is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets 
(item 6). Free Cash Flow is the gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), 
interest expenses (item 15) and dividends paid (item19+item 21). Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) 
divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Takeover Probability 
is the percentage of the predicted probability of being acquired one year before the repurchase announcement from the probit 
regression. Fixed Assets is the property, plant and equipment (item 14) over total book assets (item 6). Dividend is the sum of 
common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders over total assets (item 6). Industry Sigma is a measure of 
the volatility of an industry’s cash flow. We follow Gompers et al. (2003) and construct G-Index based on 24 governance 
provisions provided by Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). High G-Index indicates weak corporate governance. We 
include two time dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also 
include 11 industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and 
*represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
            (1)            (2)            (3)            (4) 
LBB Dummy 0.058 0.062 0.009 0.022 
 [2.01]** [2.09]** [0.42] [0.98] 
High Disclosure Dummy -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.010 
[0.07] [0.06] [0.57] [0.67] 
Prior CAR -0.093 -0.092 -0.049 -0.043 
 [3.79]*** [3.75]*** [2.38]** [2.13]** 
Tobin’s Q -0.014 -0.013 -0.000 0.001 
 [2.81]*** [2.75]*** [0.07] [0.23] 
Size 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.005 
 [0.09] [0.04] [1.09] [1.68]* 
Cash  0.089 0.088 0.099 0.098 
 [2.71]*** [2.69]*** [3.86]*** [3.89]*** 
Free Cash Flow 0.159 0.158 -0.089 -0.094 
 [1.99]** [1.97]** [1.58] [1.68]* 
Leverage 0.008 0.022 -0.115 -0.063 
 [0.23] [0.54] [4.47]*** [1.97]** 
Takeover Probability 0.007 0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
[1.25] [1.26] [1.55] [1.35] 
Fixed Assets 0.028 0.027   
 [1.15] [1.10]   
Dividend 0.608 0.612   
 [2.06]** [2.07]**   
Industry Sigma   0.021 0.019 
   [0.97] [0.87] 
G Index 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.85] [0.79] [0.51] [0.68] 
LBB Dummy*G Index -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
[1.99]** [1.93]* [0.70] [0.47] 
LBB Dummy*Leverage  -0.032  -0.111 
  [0.60]  [2.73]*** 
Lambda -0.011 -0.011 0.001 0.000 
 [0.51] [0.53] [0.05] [0.01] 
Industry Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Year Dummies           Yes           Yes           Yes           Yes 
Constant -0.077 -0.075 0.162 0.158 
 [1.08] [1.06] [3.08]*** [3.05]*** 
R 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.37 
N           357           357           339           339 
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Table 11 Motives of Leveraged Buybacks 
This table shows results of the motives of leveraged buybacks. We conduct logit analysis in column (1) and probit 
regression in column (2). The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed 
and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by 
debt.  Marginal Tax Rate is the simulated corporate marginal tax rate based on income after interest expense has been 
deducted. Prior CAR is the stock returns on the firm minus returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, calculated from 44 
days prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets 
(item 6) minus book value of equity (item144) plus market value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of 
assets (item 6). ROA is the operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset 
size (item 6), measured in 1983 dollars. Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of 
book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Free Cash Flow is the gross operating 
income (item 13) minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) and dividends 
paid (item19+item 21). Dividend is the sum of common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to shareholders 
over total assets (item 6). Z-score is Altman’s (1968) measure of credit risk. SD of Stock Return is the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns. Industry Sigma is a measure of the volatility of an industry’s cash flow. Takeover Probability is the 
percentage of the predicted probability of being acquired one year before the repurchase announcement from the probit 
regression. Excess Cash is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has excess cash prior to the buyback 
announcement and zero otherwise. Debt Capacity is a binary variable that equals one if the firm is in the highest tercile 
based on their estimated likelihood of gaining access to public debt market and zero otherwise. We include two time 
dummies capturing the Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 
industry dummy variables based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
            Logit         Probit 
Marginal Tax Rate 1.680 1.048 
 [1.72]* [1.89]* 
Prior CAR 0.604 0.365 
 [0.90] [0.92] 
Tobin’s Q -0.010 -0.001 
 [0.05] [0.01] 
ROA 6.309 3.429 
 [2.12]** [2.06]** 
Size -0.091 -0.055 
 [0.82] [0.86] 
Leverage 0.156 0.173 
 [0.15] [0.28] 
Free Cash Flow -0.388 -0.138 
 [0.14] [0.08] 
Dividend -14.640 -8.000 
 [1.18] [1.13] 
Z-score -0.091 -0.051 
 [2.02]** [2.15]** 
SD of Stock Return -1.143 -2.150 
 [0.09] [0.28] 
Industry Sigma -0.324 -0.170 
 [0.48] [0.42] 
Takeover Probability -0.631 -0.314 
 [1.31] [1.15] 
Excess Cash -1.682 -0.985 
 [5.60]*** [5.77]*** 
Debt Capacity 0.921 0.527 
 [2.48]** [2.39]** 
Constant                               1.486 0.830 
 [1.33] [1.28] 
Industry Dummies          Yes        Yes 
Year Dummies          Yes        Yes 
N          501        501 
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Table 12 Completion Rate of Leveraged Buybacks 
This table displays results of the completion rate of share repurchases. We conduct Tobit analysis in columns (1) and (2) and 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage analysis in columns (3) and (4).  We report the second-stage results in columns (3) and (4) which 
include the inverse Mills ratio estimated from the first-stage probit model. The dependent variable is the actual buyback ratio two 
years after the repurchase announcement. The actual buyback ratio is defined as purchase of common and preferred stock (item 
115) minus any decrease in redeemable preferred stock (item 175), all divided by market value of equity (item 25* item 24). LBB 
Dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the repurchase is debt-financed and zero otherwise. We define a share repurchase 
as a debt-financed one if the transaction is partially or fully financed by debt. High Disclosure Dummy is a binary variable that 
equals one if the repurchase announcement is made from Dec 2003 onwards and zero otherwise. Prior CAR is the stock returns on 
the firm minus returns on the value-weighted CRSP index, calculated from 44 days prior to the announcement until 4 days prior to 
the announcement. Tobin’s Q is defined as the book value of assets (item 6) minus book value of equity (item144) plus market 
value of equity (item 25* item 24), all divided by book value of assets (item 6). Size is defined as the log of asset size (item 6), 
measured in 1983 dollars. ROA is the operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Industry Sigma is a measure of 
the volatility of an industry’s cash flow. Cash is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Free Cash Flow 
is the gross operating income (item 13) minus the sum of depreciation (item 14), tax paid (item 16), interest expenses (item 15) 
and dividends paid (item19+item 21). Leverage is defined as book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book 
value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Fixed Assets is the property, plant and equipment 
(item 14) over total book assets (item 6). Dividend is the sum of common (item 21) and preferred (item 19) dividend paid to 
shareholders over total assets (item 6). Intended buyback ratio is the intended buyback size disclosed in the 8-k filing over the 
market value of equity (item 25* item 24). Takeover Probability is the percentage of the predicted probability of being acquired 
one year before the repurchase announcement from the probit regression. Over-levered Dummy is a binary variable that equals one 
if the firm is over-levered before the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. We include two time dummies capturing the 
Dot-com bubble from 1997 to 2000 and the financial crisis from 2007 to 2012. We also include 11 industry dummy variables 
based on Fama-French 12 industries and cluster standard errors by firm. ***, **and *represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively. 
             Tobit             Tobit       Heckman      Heckman 
LBB Dummy -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.011 
 [0.81] [1.75]* [1.03] [1.85]* 
High Disclosure 
Dummy 
0.042 0.042 0.023 0.022 
[3.37]*** [3.00]*** [2.00]** [1.80]* 
Prior CAR 0.023 0.021 0.026 0.027 
 [1.74]* [1.45] [2.16]** [2.08]** 
Tobin’s Q -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 [0.08] [0.55] [0.17] [0.68] 
Size 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 [1.01] [1.22] [0.40] [0.59] 
ROA 0.091 0.096 0.097 0.106 
 [1.56] [1.58] [2.06]** [2.14]** 
Industry Sigma 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.018 
 [0.93] [1.17] [1.17] [1.20] 
Cash  0.014 0.005 0.004 -0.003 
 [0.82] [0.27] [0.26] [0.14] 
Free Cash Flow 0.005 0.015 -0.028 -0.035 
 [0.08] [0.26] [0.52] [0.64] 
Leverage 0.015 0.019 0.011 0.018 
 [0.84] [0.79] [0.74] [0.92] 
Fixed Assets 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.014 
 [0.87] [0.92] [1.07] [0.92] 
Dividend -0.235 -0.259 -0.263 -0.310 
 [1.19] [1.24] [1.50] [1.69]* 
Intended Buyback 
Ratio 
0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 
[0.25] [0.06] [0.26] [0.34] 
Takeover Probability 
0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 
[1.80]* [1.69]* [1.46] [1.20] 
Over-levered Dummy 
 -0.015  -0.013 
 [1.31]  [1.37] 
LBB Dummy*Over-
levered  
 0.035  0.021 
 [2.59]***  [1.72]* 
Lambda 
  -0.012 -0.012 
  [1.07] [1.02] 
Industry Dummies              Yes              Yes            Yes            Yes 
Year Dummies              Yes              Yes            Yes            Yes 
Constant -0.067 -0.064 -0.005 0.007 
 [1.65]* [1.50] [0.14] [0.18] 
R2               NA               NA            0.16            0.17 
N              444               405            444            405 
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Figure 1 Changes in Cash, Leverage and Growth Prospects around Buyback Announcements 
This figure shows average changes in cash, market leverage and growth prospects prior to and following buyback 
announcements for both debt- and cash-financed repurchases. Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase is 
announced. Cash is the cash and cash equivalents (item 1) over total assets (item 6). Market Leverage is defined as book 
value of debt (item 9+ item 34) divided by the sum of book value of debt (item 9+ item 34) and market value of equity (item 
25* item 24). Growth Prospects is measured by long-run value to book, which is the difference between long-run value and 
observed book value. 
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Figure 2 Changes in Investment, ROA and Z-score around Buyback Announcements 
This figure reports average change in investment, ROA and Z-score after repurchase announcements for both debt- and cash-
financed buyback firms and their matched non-repurchasing peers. Year 0 is defined as the fiscal year when share repurchase 
is announced. Investment is defined as capital expenditure (item 145) divided by total assets (item 6). ROA is defined as 
operating income (item 13) divided by book assets (item 6). Z-score is Altman’s (1968) measure of credit risk.   
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